

Thursday, 20 June, 1946

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
at 0930.

Appearances:

For the Tribunal, same as before.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

CAPTAIN A. W. BROOKS, AUS, will hereafter be referred to as MR. A. W. BROOKS.

(Japanese to English and English

to Japanese interpretation was made by OKA, Takashi and TSUCHIYA, Jun, Sho Onodera acting as Monitor.)

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
4 except OKAWA and MATSUOKA who appear by their re-
5 spective counsel.

6 Does any counsel desire to refer to any mat-
7 ter?

8 Mr. Donihi, go ahead.

9 MR. DONIHI: May it please the Tribunal,
10 the prosecution at this time wishes to direct the
11 attention of the Tribunal to basic document 217,
12 which has been heretofore introduced in evidence
13 by Mr. Horwitz. That document number, may it please
14 the Tribunal, is the IPS document number, and is
15 not the exhibit number, this being the New Peace
16 Preservation Law enacted in 1941, and a revision
17 of the 1925 Peace Preservation Law. We wish to
18 direct the Court's attention to this for the pur-
19 pose of establishing the fact that this is the
20 law to which the last witness on yesterday had
21 testified in his affidavit as being used to stamp
22 liberalism out of the school system of Japan and
23 in the teachings thereof.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hammack.

25 MR. HAMMACK: Addressing the Marshal of the

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Court) Captain, please, will you call Tamon MAEDA.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: Mr. President, the witness is in court and will now be sworn.

T A M O N M A E D A , called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. HAMMACK:

Q What is your name?

A MAEDA, Tamon.

Q Mr. MAEDA, I show you a document, being prosecution's exhibit No. 140, and ask you to examine the same and state whether or not you recognize it.

A There are two or three phrases which are not right, but on the whole it is identified.

Q You signed this document, did you not,
Mr. MAEDA?

A Yes, I did.

Q As I understood your answer, you said there were two or three phrases which were not correct. Will you examine the document, please, and state which the two or three phrases are which are incorrect, please.

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1 A It is difficult for me -- it will take some
2 time were I to take up every single point. For ex-
3 ample, I have said -- it is written here that since
4 1930 on, the government disseminated propaganda
5 through newspapers, et cetera, to establish that
6 Manchuria is Japan's lifeline, etc.

7 Around line 12 the word "government" is used,
8 but I believe this word "government" is not correct.

9 THE MONITOR: Correction: Not around line
10 12, but about 12 lines starting from 1930.30

11 Q Do I understand that the only objection you
12 have to it is the word "government"? Is that cor-
13 rect, Mr. MAEDA?

14 A It will take some time to point out every
15 single portion of this affidavit that is like that,
16 but there is one other similar example concerning
17 this first word "government." I believe that it
18 would be more correct to say, instead of "government,"
19 "militaristic leaders," because it was not only the
20 government, but military leaders and civilians as
21 well.

22 Mr. MAEDA, I will put it this way rather than
23 attempt to explain each word. You speak English, do
24 you not?

25 A Yes, somewhat.

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1 Q And you read English, do you?

2 A Yes, I do.

3 Q You signed that document, did you, Mr.
4 MAEDA?

5 A Yes, I did sign it.

6 Q Before you signed the document, Mr. MAEDA,
7 did you read the document in English and did you
8 understand the words set forth therein?

9 A Yes, I did understand it.

10 Q And was the document also translated from
11 English into Japanese for you, and did you under-
12 stand the translation from English into Japanese?

13 A I only read the English text, and I did not
14 see the Japanese text.

15 Q Is the English text correct?

16 A As I have just said, there are two or three
17 words which I consider improper, but the general
18 import of the document is correct.

19 Q Would you say, Mr. MAEDA, with the exception
20 of the two or three words, the statements set forth
21 in this affidavit are true?

22 A Yes, I do.

23 MR. HAMMACK: May I offer this in evidence,
24 may it please the Court, and ask that it be marked
25 exhibit No. 140.

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1 MR. FURNESS: The defense objects to the
2 acceptance of this document in evidence until the
3 errors which the witness stated occurred in the doc-
4 ument are pointed out to the Court. If it takes some
5 time I think it is worth while to take that time to
6 note what the changes are.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted, subject to cor-
8 rection.

9 (Whereupon, prosecution's
10 exhibit No. 140 was received in evidence.)

11 Q Mr. MAEDA, I will read this affidavit, para-
12 graph by paragraph, and if at any time at the end of
13 each paragraph I will ask you if there is some word
14 there which should be changed, if you will kindly advise
15 me what the change should be, we will do it right now.

16 "INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
17 "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)
18 -AGAINST-) A F F I D A V I T"
ARAKI, SADAO, et al.)

20 MR. HAMMACK: Will you listen to the English,
Mr. MAEDA?

22 Q I was formerly "a newspaper editorial writer
23 and also at one time deputy mayor of Tokyo, a member
24 of the governing body of the International Labor Of-
25 fice at Geneva and Minister of Education, beginning
August 18, 1945 until January 13, 1946." Is that

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1 correct, Mr. MAEDA?

2 A That is correct.

3 Q "During the years 1928 to 1938 I was an
4 editorial writer on the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun. I
5 have no recollection in 1928 of any organized pro-
6 gram by the military or the government of Japan,
7 through newspapers, to build or develop any propa-
8 ganda in anticipation of the Manchurian Incident."

9 Is that correct, Mr. MAEDA?

10 A That is correct.

11 Q "Through 1926, 1927 and 1928 the general
12 atmosphere in Japan was tense. The military and
13 ultra-nationalistic groups attributing the weakened
14 condition of finance and weakened condition of Japan
15 during these years to too much liberal tendencies
16 on the part of the government and people." Is that
17 correct, Mr. MAEDA?

18 A That is correct.

19 Q "As a newspaper man and as such having
20 knowledge of governmental policy during this period
21 of time I know the TANAKA Cabinet was formed for the
22 purpose of adopting a more aggressive policy in con-
23 nection with Manchuria." Is that correct, Mr. MAEDA?

24 A I think so.

25 Q "Beginning with 1930 propaganda was

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1 disseminated by the government through the news-
2 papers to establish the thought in Japan that Man-
3 churia was the lifeline of Japan and a stronger
4 policy in connection with Manchuria must be adopted;
5 that acting upon instructions from the government" --
6 Is that correct?

7 A Yes, I think so.

8 Q Is that correct down that far, Mr. MAEDA?

9 A If the word "government" is changed to
10 "militaristic leaders," that will be correct.

11 Q The word "government" should be changed to
12 "militaristic leaders," is that correct, Mr. MAEDA?

13 A Yes.

14 Q -- "editorial writers, ultra-nationalistic
15 speakers and writers of books were all united in a
16 concerted effort to establish public opinion for more
17 aggressive action in Manchuria." Is that correct,
18 Mr. MAEDA?

19 A That is correct.

20 Q "In the beginning of this policy the govern-
21 ment did not take any distinct method of suppressing
22 newspapers" -- Do you think we should change the word
23 "government" there, Mr. MAEDA?

24 A Would you mind repeating that phrase?

25 Q "In the beginning of this policy the government

1 did not take any distinct method of suppressing news-
2 papers" --

3 A Yes, that is "government."

4 Q - - "in opposition to this policy but rather
5 they favored the papers, scholars and public speak-
6 ers who advocated the same. This was done very
7 tactfully and gradually. Shortly preceding 1931
8 stricter methods were used by law enforcement agen-
9 cies to suppress liberal writers, teachers and others
10 who were in opposition to this policy, while on the
11 other hand every encouragement was given those who
12 were in favor of it." Is that right, Mr. MAEDA?

13 A Yes.

14 Q "Through newspapers, publishers, writers,
15 speakers and, in fact, all channels by which propa-
16 ganda could be disseminated it was claimed on the
17 part of the government and military that Manchuria
18 was the lifeline of Japan, that Japan must expand
19 into Manchuria and develop economically and indus-
20 trially and set it up as a defense state against
21 Russia;" - - Is that correct, Mr. MAEDA?

22 A Yes.

23 Q - - "that as a result of certain treaty
24 rights, Japan was entitled to control Manchuria
25 and, in addition to this propaganda, propaganda

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1 of a sentimental nature was disseminated based up-
2 on the fact that Japanese blood had been shed in
3 Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese war and that by rea-
4 son of these sacrifices Japan was entitled to con-
5 trol Manchuria and to realize the fruits thereof."

6 Is that correct, Mr. MAEDA?

7 A Yes.

8 Q "Dr. Shumei OKAWA was one of the leading
9 writers in favor of this policy."

10 MR. FURNESS: This is very different from
11 any affidavit which has been delivered to the defense.
12 This sentence does not occur - -

13 MR. HAMMACK: Which sentence was that?

14 MR. FURNESS: The sentence that you just
15 read.

16 MR. HAMMACK: It is certainly in the origi-
17 nal, may it please the Court.

18 May it please the Court, on the copies it is
19 apparent that the sentence which I just started to
20 read was a copy not reflected on there, or was
21 obliterated out. I submit, most respectfully, that
22 it would not be injurious, and I will read it slowly
23 so that counsel may get the full import of it.

24 THE PRESIDENT: It is not in the Court's
25 copy.

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1 MR. HAMMACK: Apparently, it happened in
2 the mimeographic, may it please the Court, and I
3 will take steps to see that correct copies are sub-
4 mitted to the Court.

5 Q "Dr. Shumei OKAWA was one of the leading
6 writers in favor of this policy, there being several
7 other writers favoring the same policy such as OKAWA.
8 OKAWA's writing always urged expansion and control of
9 Manchuria by Japan." Is that correct, Mr. MAEDA?

10 A Yes.

11 Q "Following the Manchurian Incident the
12 government and the military started an organized
13 program of justifying Japan's position in Manchuria,
14 partly to offset the criticism at home." Is that
15 correct, Mr. MAEDA?

16 A Yes.

17 Q "Following the Manchurian Incident the War
18 Ministry started censoring newspapers and editorials
19 and in addition to the censorship laws relating to
20 this subject officers called on any writer or news-
21 paper who might have printed something that was un-
22 satisfactory to the War Ministry and advised such
23 writer or newspaper that such an article was dis-
24 pleasing to the War Ministry. Further control of
25 newspapers and editorial writers was exercised by

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1 the War Miristry through the use of several vio-
2 lent organizations who would give threats to the
3 writer or to the editor of a newspaper publishing
4 anything considered unfavorable to the policy of
5 the government and the military." Is that correct,
6 Mr. MAEDA?

7 A Yes, it is.

8 Q "About 1936 when the Anti-Comintern Pact
9 was signed I gave a lecture at a certain meeting at
10 which I stated at this lecture that by reason of
11 this Anti-Comintern Pact Japan had isolated herself
12 from the rest of the world and in which lecture I
13 expressed disapproval of the Anti-Comintern Pact.
14 As a result of this lecture two officers of the rank
15 of lieutenant colonel, one from the War Ministry
16 and another from the General Staff, called on me,
17 stating that each had been attaches to the Japanese
18 Embassy, one in Italy and the other in Germany; that
19 they did not like my expressing disapproval of the
20 Anti-Comintern Pact and instructed me that in the
21 future when writing or speaking on such subjects to
22 do so in a more favorable aspect. While no actual
23 threats were made to me there was much rattling of
24 their sabers and no possibility of misunderstanding
25 their disapproval of my action." Is that correct,

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Mr. MAEDA?

A That is correct.

MR. FURNESS: That does not occur in our copy.

THE PRESIDENT: That is not in the Court's copy.

MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I think since we have this witness here on the stand, we could save a lot of time by asking a few direct questions. To bring out only those relevant points, would clarify our cross-examination. This line of the prosecution's case, in this type of form does no more than allow leading questions and then allow these men to put their rubber stamp on them. There are a lot of statements here that I have noticed, that are word for word, and there are three affidavits that are word for word and also which are, paragraph by paragraph, the same. It is apparent that no such statements were made to this prosecutor. It is apparent on its face that some of these things are hearsay testimony, especially this group going into the record today, and those giving us during the last twenty-four hours. A lot of leading statements would be asked to bring out certain portions of the case in which the prosecution has the burden of proof, but this puts the burden on the defense, and they have to put a lot of time on matters that need explanation for the

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1 Court's benefit; things that not only burden the
2 defense, that have to do this, but also the Court.
3 I ask the Court to reconsider, and to allow certain
4 expeditious questions to be put to these men by
5 direct examination.

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MR. HAMMACK: May I say this, may it please the Court: It is obvious from the attitude of the various witnesses who have been called that they would not sign any document or affidavit unless they were certain as to its correctness and the facts were true. In reply to counsel's objection that these affidavits are similar, that follows as the day follows the night because the facts are absolutely identical and they could not be placed any other way where the facts are so identical, as has been established in connection with the public school system in Japan and, with the exception of a variation of a word of the person signing the document, you cannot change facts that absolutely exist.

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard enough at this stage. Proceed with the reading of the affidavit. The errors are not being concealed from the defense. You can cross-examine upon them after.

MR. FURNESS: We are confused as to which is the correct document, the document we have in our hands or the document which the prosecution is reading.

MR. HAMMACK: Here is a copy of it. I am quite certain it is correct, counsel, which I will be very happy to let you have.

THE PRESIDENT: I want to emphasize no

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1 error is concealed from the defense and the errors
2 disclosed can be cross-examined upon. There is no
3 need for all these objections; they are a waste of
4 time.

5 MR. HAMMACK: (Reading) "I ordered all of
6 such textbooks destroyed for the reason they were
7 used to teach the students, first, that Japan was a
8 country superior to all other countries, that was
9 the most objectionable; another was the confusion of
10 facts with mystery and legend; too much admiration
11 of military action and warfare; too much admiration
12 and homage to military officers and the idea of ab-
13 solute subjection of the individual in favor of the
14 state.

15 "In addition to the textbooks which I ordered
16 destroyed for the reasons stated there was also issued
17 by the Ministry of Education to be widely read by
18 teachers, students and citizens at large a book en-
19 titled 'Fundamental Principles of the National Polity,'
20 published in May 1937, and 'The Way of National
21 Subjects,' which was published in March 1941.

22 "Upon becoming Minister of Education in 1945
23 a survey of the Japanese school system as it had existed
24 previously established that before the China Incident
25 the military took over control of all the schools

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1 by placing in the schools Army officers who super-
2 vised the military teaching and training, this
3 control following the China Incident becoming so
4 absolute that such officers instructed the princi-
5 pals of the schools as to how the courses and
6 administration of the school system should be con-
7 ducted. Tamon MAEDA."

8 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: Mr. President, at
9 this time I must inform the Tribunal that due to the
10 number of breaks in the reading of Mr. Hammack's
11 English version of the affidavit, it has not been
12 possible to read the Japanese version simultaneously
13 over the IBM System. At this time, with the Tribunal's
14 permission, we shall read the Japanese version as
15 supplied to us by the prosecution.

16 MR. HAMMACK: May that be done, may it
17 please the Court?

18 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

19 (Whereupon, the Japanese version
20 of the affidavit was read.)

21 BY MR. HAMMACK (Continued):

22 Q Mr. MAEDA, I show you a document that has
23 been marked "Prosecution's No. 262" and ask you to
24 examine this document, please, and state whether or
25 not you recognize it.

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1 A Yes, I identify it.

2 Q What is the name of that document or book,
3 please?

4 A "The Way of Subjects."

5 Q Will you state--

6 MR. WARREN: May we have that answer again,
7 sir?

8 THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear it.

9 MR. HAMMACK: "The Way of the Subject."

10 Q Mr. MAEDA, by whom was this book published?

11 A The Department of Education.

12 Q Was this book issued by the Department of
13 Education to teachers and students of the Japanese
14 schools?

15 A Not necessarily only to be read by teachers
16 and students. It was published for the purpose of
17 being read besides these people by the people at
18 large.

19 Q Will you state when this book was published,
20 Mr. MAEDA?

21 A I believe it was published in the year 1941
22 but I may be mistaken. However, you have the book.
23 You would probably be more sure of that than myself.

24 Q Will you please examine the book, Mr. MAEDA,
25 and state if you can from the book when it was

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published?

A This book, "The Way of Subjects," if we examine fragmentary facts just portion by portion, there are some parts, of course, which are useful, which are not altogether bad. For instance, there are several useful quotations from classics, but I criticize the general tendency of this book. When this book is taken as a whole, the spirit that it shows is to be criticized.

Q The question, Mr. MAEDA, was--

THE PRESIDENT: Just a second--

MR. HAMMACK: Pardon me, your Honor.

LANGUAGE ARBITER (MAJOR MOORE): Mr. President, the interpretation, sir, of the question was wrong and gave the witness a wrong idea of what the question was.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, what was the answer to the question?

Q The question, Mr. MAEDA, was, will you state when the book was published, please?

A It was published on March 31, 1941.

Q May I have the book back now, please?

A Certainly.

MR. HAMMACK: At this time, may it please the Court, I wish to offer this book in evidence as

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1 prosecution's next in order and that it be given
2 the number 262 -- 121 -- 141.

3 (Whereupon, the book above
4 referred to was marked prosecution's
5 exhibit No. 141 for identification.)

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted subject to the
7 usual terms.

8 (Whereupon, prosecution's
9 exhibit No. 141 was received in evidence.)

10 MR. WARREN: If the Court please, I would
11 like to have a chance to examine that book. I have
12 never seen it. I have never received any copy of it.
13 I would like to have a chance to see what it is be-
14 fore we go to testifying about it. I think we have
15 a right of examination of documents being offered
16 in evidence.

17 THE PRESIDENT: It is admitted and you may
18 peruse a copy of it or peruse it.

19 MR. WARREN: Do we have any copies avail-
20 able? We don't even have a copy of it. As far as I
21 know, I have not seen it.

22 MR. HAMMACK: Copies, your Honor, of
23 portions which have been extracted from the book
24 were served on counsel for defense yesterday.

25 MR. FURNESS: Will you give us the document

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1 number so we can look in our files and get it?

2 MR. HAMMACK: The number is 1675.

3 MR. FURNESS: Are only the portions which
4 appear in the paper which you gave to us offered now
5 in evidence or the entire book?

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1 MR. HAMMACK: That is correct. "We are
2 offering the entire book, your Honor, for conven-
3 ience of counsel.

4 THE PRESIDENT: There are now four counsel
5 standing up to object to a document which, you say,
6 was served on them. That is utterly ludicrous.

7 MR. HAMMACK: "We are offering in evidence
8 in English and Japanese certain extracts from the
9 book. "We have not attempted to have it translated
10 in its entirety but the book itself is there for the
11 convenience of counsel for the defense who may use
12 it for whatever purpose they see fit.

15 THE PRESIDENT: "We take your word for it,
16 Mr. Hammack, that you are observing the rules about
17 documents and that you are serving copies on the
18 accused or their counsel.

18 MR. HAMMACK: Yes, your Honor, but I do
19 wish to make this statement, however. I have nothing
20 to do with the distributing system and I was advised
21 yesterday afternoon as I left court, by the person
22 who is responsible for it, that these copies had been
23 served upon counsel for the defense, I think around
24 four o'clock yesterday afternoon.

25 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I would like to request that the instruction be made by the

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1 Tribunal on this matter of service of these copies
2 that would bind the defendants as well as the prosecu-
3 tion, that any copy offered in evidence, that there
4 be a certificate attached showing the date and the
5 hour served upon the opposing counsel, either to
6 their office, their administrative office could
7 sign -- one clerk could sign. It would resolve
8 these questions and I think will prevent these
9 things from happening that are happening in the
10 court. Because if they do not have that, the party
11 offering in evidence will know something has gone
12 wrong and will not take up the Court's time and
13 cause this confusion.

14 MR. HAMMACK: I am advised, may it please
15 the Court, that as these copies are sent down to the
16 office of defense counsel, someone down there signs
17 for all of them so they can easily ascertain whether
18 they have been received or not by inquiring of the
19 person assigned to that duty.

20 MR. BROOKS: I would like for the Court, if
21 you please, to have that presented here so when my
22 copy comes in, the prosecution has it right there
23 before them, the evidence that we have served upon
24 them twenty-four hours in advance, anything that we
25 may introduce; and I would like to have the same

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1 thing applied at this time on our behalf as part of
2 the case. His own statement the other day was that
3 one of the papers was not served twenty-four hours.
4 There are several hours difference. "We are very
5 limited in our time once we are out of the court
6 and I think it would be quite proper for the Court
7 to put in, and respectfully request that a ruling
8 be made that any matter placed in evidence here,
9 that a certificate be signed by one of the adminis-
10 trative officers, either prosecution or defense,
11 whichever case it happens to be, that it was served,
12 acknowledging service and acknowledging receipt on
13 the date and hour indicated.

14 MR. HAMMACK: I object to that, your Honor,
15 on the ground it would only have one tendency, that
16 is, to create more difficulties and more red tape.
17 I submit the practical matter is the one that has
18 been adopted that someone in the office sign for all
19 copies. If an attempt is made to serve on all counsel,
20 you would never get them together, for one thing. It
21 would be an impossibility.

22 MR. BROOKS: I have not requested all counsel,
23 if your Honor please. I have only requested that the
24 Records Office of each side, prosecution or defense,
25 someone sign for all counsel in each case, but just

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1 to show that it was served on their administrative
2 office twenty-four hours in advance. It hasn't
3 happened several times here.

4 THE PRESIDENT: It occurs to us that
5 Captain Brooks' suggestion is a very sensible one.
6 There should be one person on whom to serve all of
7 the documents upon the defense and that one person
8 should give a receipt and undertake distribution
9 among all of the counsel for the accused. I did
10 not know that that existed. That does show some
11 sort of organization among the accused's counsel.
12 We thought that was missing. And the receipt should
13 show the hour at which the document was received
14 so that it can be checked up with the rules.

15 MR. HAMMACK: That has been done and will
16 be done and we will continue to do so, your Honor.
17

18 THE PRESIDENT: This is not a document
19 that came to light at the last minute. You must have
20 had it for months.

21 MR. HAMMACK: It was a translation problem,
22 if it please the Court.
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A 1 MR. HAMMACK: At this time, may it please
b 2 the Court, I offer in evidence the English translation
r 3 from the prosecution's exhibit No. 141, and request
a 4 the privilege at this time of reading the English
m 5 translation from that book. (Reading):
& 6
M 7 "THE WAY OF A SUBJECT
o 8 (March 31, 1941)
r 9
s 10 Preface
e 11
12 "The way of a subject of the Empire orig-
13 inates in the fundamental character of our Empire
14 is in the guarding and maintaining of the prosperity
15 of the Imperial Throne coeval with Heaven and earth.
16 This is not an abstract form, but a historical stand-
17 ard set down firmly for our daily life and conduct;
18 the people's entire lives and activities solely
19 point toward the enhancing of the Imperial Foundation.
20 "Since the Meiji Restoration our country has
21 been seeking knowledge far and wide throughout the
22 world, fostering, thereby, the root of Imperial
23 development and prosperity, but with the intro-
24 duction of Occidental civilization, we have come
25 to be influenced by individualism, liberalism,

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utilitarianism, materialism and others, and have often fallen into the error of running counter to our time-honored national character, thus, impairing the fine customs that have long been handed down to us from our ancestors. Since the outbreak of the MANCHURIAN Incident, and the subsequent occurrence of the CHINA Incident, our national spirit has gradually been heightened, but in looking into the various phases of our national life, I dare not say that we all have a clear understanding of the fundamental character of our Empire or have a thorough conception of our position as a Japanese. It is a matter of deep concern that we sometimes find those who knowing the sanctity of our Empire, let it remain as a mere idea, never embodying it in their actual daily lives. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to get rid of the evils of the Occidental thoughts which have deeply and persistently permeated into the different phases of our national life and to set up a nation-wide system to guard and support the Imperial prosperity, and ultimately to achieve our intended undertaking, the greatest of its kind ever known in history. I assert therefore that the urgent need of the hour is to

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1 discard the ideas of individualism and utilitar-
2 ianism and to live up to the duty of the Imperial
3 subject -- the duty whose primary aim is in the
4 service to the country.

5 "It is true that originally world pene-
6 tration by the European nations was from an advent-
7 urer's interest, but it was mainly prompted by
8 insatiable materialistic desires. They slaughter-
9 ed the aborigines, or enslaved them, or dispossess-
10 ed them of their lands, making it their colonies;
11 natural resources were taken back to their home-
12 lands in great quantities and enormous profits
13 were gained through trade. Thus, in their in-
14 vasions all the world over, they dared to commit
15 atrocities which neither heaven nor man could
16 tolerate, perpetrating these cruelties again and
17 again. How were the American Indians dealt with?
18 How about the African blacks? They were rounded
19 up as white men's slaves, and driven about like
20 beasts on the American continent. Look at those
21 people of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity
22 Sphere! How were they subdued? And how do they
23 fare now? This may easily convince you of the
24 truth of what I have just stated above.

25 "The World War I had undoubtedly a great

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1 deal to do with the long standing hostile relations
2 between Germany and France, but the primary cause
3 lies in the Anglo-German strife for maritime and
4 economic supremacy. The war ended in defeat for
5 Germany, who, thoroughly hard pressed by the vic-
6 tors, was driven to the verge of utter ruin, while
7 it evermore strengthened the Anglo-American monopo-
8 listic mastery of the world. The weak minor nations
9 which were set up under the cloak of racial determ-
10 ination, beautifully variegating the map of the post-
11 war Europe, were, after all, merely stepping stones
12 for Britain, France and America to gain world su-
13 premacy. In other words, the so-called justice and
14 humanity proved to be nothing more than a pretext
15 for justifying their selfish standings.

16 "It is individualism, liberalism, and mater-
17 ialism that have constituted the basis of Occidental
18 civilization since the early period of modern times.
19 They justified the act of 'the stronger prey on the
20 weaker' unlimitedly increased the desires for pleas-
21 ure, caused the pursuance of high material living,
22 stimulated the acquisition of colonies and incited
23 fierce competition in commerce. All these factors
24 in turn became cause and effect reducing the whole
25 world into veritable shambles and finally brought

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about that self-destruction of World War I.

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1 "It is, therefore, of no wonder that soon
2 after the end of the war fear for the possible
3 downfall of Western civilization was cried by some
4 of the Westerners themselves. While Britain,
5 France and America were engrossed in their efforts
6 to maintain their status quo, on one hand, a formi-
7 dable movement for social revolution by class wars
8 based on thoroughgoing materialism, such as Commu-
9 nism was, on the other hand, being intensified.
10 Again, in the meanwhile, Nazism and Fascism were
11 being ushered into the world; the doctrine of
12 racialism and totalitarianism in Germany and Italy
13 being in the eliminating and reforming of the will
14 occasioned by Individualism and Liberalism.

15 "The MANCHURIAN Incident was an outburst
16 of our suppressed national life. This Incident
17 with CHINA signifies Japan's step towards the
18 creation of a moral world and the establishment
19 of a new order in the eyes of the Powers. This
20 is indeed a manifestation fo the spirit with
21 which the eternal and sublime JAPANESE Empire
22 was first established and an inevitable outburst
23 of our national life that had been historically
24 entrusted to us by the world.

25 "The amazingly brilliant national

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1 development and expansion of JAPAN gave rise to
2 envy and jealousy on the part of the European and
3 American nations, whose aspiration was to annex
4 East Asia, and they, as a counter measure have
5 tried to check our ever-enhancing national
6 strength by laying economic pressure upon us,
7 or scheming political disturbances, or planning
8 Japan's international isolation. This action of
9 theirs is no less an attempt to deprive East Asia
10 of its independence, thus making it an eternal
11 puppet in their own hands.

12 "With the increasingly strained situations
13 on the Pacific, Japan's position in East Asia con-
14 fronts a serious condition. To be more explicit,
15 China, encouraged by the rigorous oppression of
16 Japan by the European and American countries, in-
17 duced them to accord their economic aid and at the
18 same time sought a rearproachment with Russia.
19 Exultant with her success, China then began to
20 belittle Japan's national strength, and even to
21 conceive the notion that Japan was easy to deal
22 with, until she finally dared to trample on Japan's
23 status in Manchuria which had been secured at the
24 cost of our brethren's flesh and blood, thus con-
25 stituting a menace to the lifeline of the Japanese

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1 Empire. This led to the outbreak of the MANCHURIAN
2 Incident of September, 1931.

3 "In July, 1937, when a clash took place
4 between JAPAN and CHINA at LUKOWKIAO, our country
5 adopted a policy of solving the issue on the spot
6 in the hope of localizing the affair for the sake
7 of the peace and welfare of East Asia and waited
8 patiently for CHINA'S self reflection. However,
9 CHINA continued as ever before to belittle our
10 actual strength, and eventually went so far as to
11 develop the matter into an overall collision de-
12 pending on the powers behind her; and thus the
13 continent was shook by the bursts of the guns and
14 a situation most regrettable for Asia was brought
15 about. Now that things have come to this pass,
16 there is nothing left for us to do but to proceed
17 resolutely to fulfill the solemn mission entrusted
18 to our Empire of establishing a New East Asia and
19 to fulfill the firm determination to cut the Gordian
20 knot once for all.

21 "....The position of our Empire as the
22 leader of East Asia has hereby been made all the
23 more fixed, and that the "Universal Benevolence" --
24 the spirit with which our Empire was first set up
25 should be the very idea underlying the establishment

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1 of a New Order in the world. This has been fully
2 clarified.

3 "....That is to say, we must politically
4 assist the countries within the co-prosperity
5 sphere of Greater East Asia which have been colo-
6 nized as the result of the Westerners' aggression
7 in the East, so that these people may liberate
8 themselves from the white man's domination and
9 economically exterminate the Westerners' squeez-
10 ing operations, and to establish a smooth self-
11 supporting economic system based on the co-
12 existence and co-prosperity principle; and, in the
13 field of culture, instead of being a mere follower
14 of Western civilization, enrich our Oriental cul-
15 ture and contribute towards the creation of a
16 righteous world culture.

17 "The work of establishing a New World
18 Order has just taken a step in its course; a group
19 of liberal democratic nations -- ardent supporters
20 of maintaining the status quo -- are cooperating
21 together in making desperate efforts to baffle
22 our undertakings, and the colonies are still en-
23 trapped in the illusion that they have to rely on
24 the **Europeans** and Americans for their subsistence.
25 To reach our set goal we have a long, long way to

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1 go yet, and the path we have to tread is by no
2 means a broad level highway.

3 "The brilliant success that the Germans
4 are achieving in the present war is not due only
5 to their highly developed mechanized forces, but
6 to the vigorous national spirit which in peace-
7 time served as a mainstay and a mainspring of the
8 armies, and to the fervent popular co-operation
9 in national defense.

10 "And the guarding and maintaining of the
11 prosperity of the Imperial Throne is the true ob-
12 ject of strengthening the national total war
13 system, and it is by the practice on the part of
14 the people of their duties as loyal subjects
15 according to their own means and abilities that
16 this object can be attained. The Soviet Russia
17 aims at world domination by Communism, and as a
18 means to fulfill her object, she makes use of the
19 strong power of class-dictatorship. As for Ger-
20 many, she stands on the principle of blood and
21 soil racialism stressing the frustration of the
22 Anglo-Saxon's intentions to dominate the world
23 and the subversion of the present condition of
24 oppressed Germany. In order to carry out these
25 purposes, Germany adheres to the principle of

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1 totalitarianism urging her people to give abso-
2 lute obedience to, and have implicit confidence
3 in Nazi dictatorship.

4 "As for our country, since the ancient
5 times when NINIGI-NO-MIKOTO descended on the Land
6 of Rice-plants to rule in accordance with the
7 divine command given him by AMATERASU-OMIKAMI,
8 it has been ruled over by an unbroken line of
9 Emperors, and the subjects ever united in loyalty
10 and filial piety have from generation to gen-
11 eration assisted their Majesties' august under-
12 takings. It is thus that the glory of the funda-
13 mental character of our everlasting Empire shines
14 brilliantly.

15 "We, the subjects venture to look up to
16 the Imperial Household as our head family, and
17 are enjoying the privilege of leading a one nation --
18 one family life. There are, of course, other
19 races who, in the past attracted by the benevolent
20 influence of the Imperial rule, have come over to
21 our country and served for the Emperors. These
22 aliens under the august virtue of His Majesty,
23 were all blessed with favors as an Imperial sub-
24 ject and, in the course of time, fused into one,
25 both spiritually and physically, and have dis-

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1 charged their duties as loyal subjects. His
2 Majesty's virtue was broad and boundless, en-
3 veloping the whole world and assimilating the
4 whole of creation. The essence of one nation --
5 one family was ever more realized, and our glorious
6 nation where the Sovereign and his subjects are
7 united as one has been as prosperous from age to
8 age as heaven and earth are eternal.

9 "To be united in one body in serving the
10 Emperor who loves us tenderly is the essential
11 qualities of the subjects. This duty to faith-
12 fully obey and serve the Emperor is the way for
13 the subjects to follow. In the 17th Chapter of the
14 Constitution of Shotoku-Taishi which begins with
15 the precept that "Harmony is valuable"

16 "To begin with, in our country, loyalty
17 comes before filial piety; loyalty is the great
18 principle. We are parents and children in a family,
19 and the parents and children are in turn subjects.
20 Filial piety in our home must at the same time be
21 loyalty. Loyalty and filial piety are one and in-
22 separable. This is due to the nationality of our
23 country, wherein exists characteristics in-
24 comparable in other countries. In our country,
25 from the very outset, the husband and wife have

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1 not been the unit of a family as in other western
2 countries. The relation between parents and child-
3 constituted the center of the home, and as a conse-
4 quence, it is natural that filial piety is re-
5 spected.

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1 "Imperial subjects in this new era must
2 train themselves as subjects of this Empire. That
3 is to say, by fully understanding the significance
4 of our nationality, living on strong faith as subjects
5 of our Empire, adhering to fidelity, excelling in
6 clear-sightedness, training strong will and prime
7 physical strength, cultivating practical ability,
8 we must strive forward for the attainment of the
9 historical mission of our Empire. This is the
10 training we subjects of our Empire must go through."

11 MR. McMANUS: At this time, if the Tri-
12 bunal please, I make an objection to these excerpts
13 being read into the record. I dare say that I or any
14 one of the defense counsel, by taking half sentences
15 and certain paragraphs from any book, could form a
16 very excellent brief on behalf of the defendants.
17 The document is in evidence. I am sure the Members
18 of the Tribunal will read this and understand exactly
19 what is here; however, my objection at this time is
20 to having these excerpts read into the record in
21 practically the form of a brief.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. McManus, you know
23 the remedy. Tender the balance of the article.

24 MR. HAMMACK: (Reading): "Successive
25 Emperors are descendants of the Founders of the

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1 Empire. The Founders and Emperors have the relation
2 of parents and children, and the relationship of the
3 Emperor and subjects is that of lord and retainers,
4 but in feeling that of father and son. Gods and
5 Emperors, Emperors and subjects, are really one body,
6 wherein lies the foundation for the way of loyalty
7 and filial piety as one and worship of God and re-
8 spect for ancestors.

9 "Training for an Imperial subject, should
10 be directed at the cultivation of the spirit to
11 push forward with decision and bravery. What should
12 be done, should be done with all willingness and
13 what should not be done, should never be done. This
14 spirit of practice must be based on the belief firmly
15 settled in the fundamental character of our Empire.
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17 "Since the very olden times it has been a
18 customary practice with us to attach much importance
19 to discipline, which constitutes one of the character-
20 istic features of our education. The process of con-
21 centrating teaching and learning in the "way" of per-
22 fection is called training. BUSHIDO, for instance,
23 has succeeded in manifesting its very soul by per-
24 petual training day and night, especially from one's
25 childhood. The same is true of KENDO, JUDO, archery,

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1 tea ceremony, flower-arrangement, and other arts.
2 It is only by actual training and practice that one
3 can initiate one's self into the mysteries of the
4 art. To cite another instance, BUDHISM was accepted
5 in our country as a guard-the-nation doctrine, and
6 was taken into our popular life as a means of foster-
7 ing the virtues of loyalty and filial piety. With
8 regard to CONFUCIANISM, a like attitude was also
9 adopted. Therefore, in the case of Western sciences
10 and arts, there should be no change in our attitude
11 toward them. We, as an Imperial subject of the
12 modern era, must fully appreciate the gravity of the
13 duty with which we are entrusted, and faithfully
14 follow the footsteps of our predecessors. Awake or
15 asleep, at home or abroad, it should be our constant
16 concern to train ourselves so that we may be capable
17 of the task assigned to us as Imperial subjects and
18 realize our services to the country.

19 "We, the subjects of the Empire, have been
20 entrusted with the grave responsibility of supporting
21 the Imperial prosperity eternally ever since the
22 foundation of the Empire which took place long, long
23 ago. This body and this mind ends in their devout
24 service to the Emperor. Our forefathers have like-
25 wise lived in the same duty and have handed it down

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1 to us. Our life is ours, and yet not ours. Con-
2 sequently, our actual life itself is a thing at
3 once solemn and historical. To be an independent
4 man aside a subject is impossible; and, furthermore,
5 apart from public affairs, there are no private
6 affairs. The Emperor is the nucleus of our life,
7 which can be made one worth living by our service
8 to the state.

9 " What is commonly called private life lies
10 after all in the performance of the duty of the sub-
11 ject, and it holds its public significance in that
12 it is the subject's work which in turn assists the
13 Emperor with His august work. "As far as the heaven-
14 ly clouds spread and as far as the waters extend,"
15 so far is the land of the Mikado and so far are the
16 subjects sheltered. Therefore, it is not permissible
17 for anyone to indulge in self-will, thinking that
18 one's private life has nothing to do with the state,
19 and to do whatever he pleases.

20 " In Japan, a family consists of one lineal
21 linking of ancestry and descent and a combination of
22 family members with the family head as its center.
23 In other words, the Japanese family is built up around
24 the head of the family with the relationship between

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1 parent and children playing an important
2 part, and it differs from a Western family where
3 the husband and wife are the nucleus. In the Japanese
4 family, there is a clear distinction, a systematized
5 order between family head and family, parent
6 and child, husband and wife, brothers and sisters,
7 both young and old, the dead forefathers are worshipped
8 as if they were alive, and children yet to be born are
9 associated in the eternity of the family as future
10 members of the family. This is how lineal
11 linking of ancestry and descent is realized. Furthermore,
12 the family is directly connected with the state.

13 "What primarily ought to be stressed in the
14 family life is the spirit of reverence for the Gods
15 and ancestor worship. These two ideas are a demonstration
16 of one's submission to the source of one's life.
17 They are also the fundamental cause of our holding
18 the family in high respect. Reverence for the Gods
19 leads us through Gods to unite us to the Emperor.

21 "Reverence for the Gods and worship of the
22 ancestors are acts of piety and this in turn arouses
23 the feeling of thanks and gratitude, the virtue which
24 safeguards one from becoming an individualist or an
25 egoist. In the family where reverence for the Gods

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1 and ancestor worship are neglected, there is some-
2 thing lacking in the spirit of juvenile home educa-
3 tion, and from such a family no cultivation of
4 national spirit can be expected. It is, therefore,
5 essential that home life should have its basis
6 placed on the original spirit of reverence for the
7 Gods and ancestor worship as its daily guidance."

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1 THE PRESIDENT: That will do for the time
2 being, Mr. Hammack. Is the balance of that article
3 available to you or to the accused?

4 MR. HAMMACK: Sir?

5 THE PRESIDENT: Is the balance of the article
6 available?

7 MR. HAMMACK: The entirety is in the volume
8 offered in evidence, may it please your Honor, but
9 the balance has not been translated.

10 MR. FURNESS: It has not been served on the
11 defense. The only thing that has been served on us
12 are these excerpts which are being read.

13 THE PRESIDENT: We are inclined to think
14 that you should translate the untranslated part
15 and serve that.

16 MR. HAMMACK: May I say this, may it please
17 the Court: the translation problem is impossible.
18 We have complied with the rules of the Court by
19 serving upon counsel for the defense copies of the
20 parts which we depend upon. We have made available
21 to them the original. The prosecution cannot, as
22 a physical possibility, translate half the docu-
23 ments that we need, and to undertake to translate
24 this whole document for the defense would put us in
25 a position where we could not translate anything for

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1 the prosecution. May I say this, your Honor, to im-
2 press upon the Court how serious it is, some of the
3 best documents we have we cannot put in evidence
4 because we cannot get them translated in time. One
5 of the books that this witness has mentioned we can-
6 not put in evidence, because I do not think we can
7 get it translated.

8 THE PRESIDENT: I want to make a remark at
9 present; I want to ask some facts, if I can. It
10 appears that you translated the parts that you in-
11 tended to rely upon and served them.

12 MR. HAMMACK: That is correct, yes, sir.

13 THE PRESIDENT: That complies with the rule.

14 MR. HAMMACK: Yes, sir.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Well, now, the defense wants
16 to rely on the untranslated. Who has the obligation
17 of furnishing the translation of the untranslated
18 part?

19 MR. HAMMACK: That is the obligation of the
20 defense to provide their own translation.

21 MR. McMANUS: To put that burden on the
22 defense as a proof is unnecessary.

23 THE PRESIDENT: There is such a thing as
24 making a defense.

25 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please ---

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1 THE PRESIDENT: Well, my brothers take the
2 view also that the defense must translate the parts
3 upon which they rely.

4 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please --

5 THE PRESIDENT: There are too many standing
6 up at the same time. We shall recess for fifteen
7 minutes.

8 (Whereupon, at 1055, a recess was
9 taken until 1110, after which the proceedings
10 were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is
2 now resumed.

3 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, may I
4 say a few words with respect to your last ruling?

5 THE PRESIDENT: You must accept it. It is
6 not open to challenge. I do not know what you are
7 going to say, but that is the ruling of the Court.

8 MR. LOGAN: May I be heard on this, your
9 Honor?

10 THE PRESIDENT: Not with a view to having
11 it changed, no; but you may suggest the difficul-
12 ties that you have, and we may be able to meet them.

13 MR. LOGAN: May I point out the section
14 of the rule to which I am referring?

15 THE PRESIDENT: No. We have read the
16 rules.

17 MR. LOGAN: With respect to the difficul-
18 ties of the defense, we are organized, we are meet-
19 ing every night and appearing in court every day.
20 We have approximately twenty translators as op-
21 posed to, I understand, over two hundred for the
22 prosecution. The assets of these accused are
23 frozen. We cannot obtain the money to get more
24 translators. On the other hand, the prosecution
25 stated on June 3 that they were ready to proceed,

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1 and they made a fervent plea that this case proceed
2 on that day, and this Tribunal granted us a ten-day
3 adjournment. The prosecution has been preparing its
4 case, I understand, for the last seven months. They
5 have presented a document here today of which, as we
6 interpret the rules, they are supposed to offer an
7 English translation of the entire document, and
8 they have produced an English translation only of
9 the excerpts.

10 Now, I would like to find out how the prosecu-
11 tion could possibly have determined and chosen
12 those excerpts unless they had the entire document
13 completely translated into English.

14 THE PRESIDENT: One can readily conceive
15 how they could single out what I might call the
16 pertinent passages without making a written transla-
17 tion of the whole.

18 I understand you to suggest that they must
19 have a written translation of the whole. That would
20 not follow.

21 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I
22 believe that Rule 6b, as amended on May 20, 1946,
23 so provides.

24 THE PRESIDENT: We have considered that.
25 It has not been overlooked but has been the subject

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1 of much note-passing between Members of the Tribunal,
2 if I may take you into our confidence to that effect.
3 It has been considered.

4 But do not go away. We would like to thresh
5 this matter out. You say you have grave difficulty
6 in getting translations.

7 MR. LOGAN: Yes.

8 THE PRESIDENT: The prosecution says some of
9 its most important documents must remain unrevealed
10 to us because of translation difficulties. But
11 translation difficulties can be overcome by the ex-
12 penditure of money on both sides; and we expect it to
13 be spent. We expect the best possible translation
14 service to be available both to the prosecution and
15 to the accused if this trial is to proceed in accord-
16 ance with the terms of the Charter.

17 Able translators must be available in any
18 number in this country.

19 We take it that you have received the whole
20 book in pursuance of Rule 6b.

21 MR. LOGAN: Your Honor, we have not received
22 it.

23 MR. HAMMACK: May I explain why, may it
24 please the Court? They have not received copies,
25 or another copy of that book, because I do not

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1 believe there is another copy in existence. Those
2 books were destroyed, and it was our good fortune
3 to get them from Mr. MAEDA who retained two copies;
4 one is this book, and the other one, the one which
5 I have mentioned. I believe those to be the only two
6 in existence, one which is in evidence, and the other
7 one which I am trying to have translated.

8 THE PRESIDENT: We see no reason why full
9 copies should not have been made because you have had
10 that book in your possession for months. You have not
11 contradicted that. I suggested you had, and you have
12 not denied it.

13 Money is no consideration in this case. If
14 money is a consideration in this case this trial may
15 never conclude.

16 MR. HAMMACK: May I say this, your Honor. The
17 original book is in evidence, available to the de-
18 fendants and their counsel. And, as a practical
19 matter, I see no reason why they should not have that
20 book examined by one of their own translators for
21 whatever comfort and aid they may be able to find
22 therein.

23 THE PRESIDENT: There is no excuse for not
24 carrying out 6b. None has been given. The only
25 excuse that could be given would be time and expense,

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1 and they are of no consideration here. The necessary
2 services must be obtained at any cost.

3 We will stand the witness down for cross-
4 examination until the whole book is available to the
5 defense.

6 MR. JUSTICE MANSFIELD: If the Tribunal,
7 please, the only portion of the book which is being
8 introduced in evidence is the excerpt. We are not
9 introducing the whole book into evidence, and, there-
10 fore, under the rule it is only the document which
11 we are putting in evidence, which, I submit respect-
12 fully, is required to be used, to be copied. We may
13 put in, in certain cases, the whole of a document and
14 only rely particularly on certain parts; but where
15 we only put in parts of a document in evidence,
16 then I submit that under the rule we are only
17 required to furnish a copy of the part of the doc-
18 ument which we introduce in evidence. And we have,
19 in fact, done that.

20 THE PRESIDENT: This is 6b, now, Mr. Justice
21 Mansfield. I am not reading a lot.

22 "A copy of every document intended to be
23 adduced in evidence by the prosecution or the defense
24 will be delivered to the accused concerned or his
25 counsel or to the prosecution ... Every such copy

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1 shall have plainly marked thereon the part or
2 parts upon which the prosecution or the defense,
3 as the case may be, intends to rely . . ."

4 That suggests the whole document must be
5 delivered, and every such copy shall be accompanied
6 by a translation into English or into Japanese, as
7 the case may be, of the said part or parts. But the
8 whole document must be delivered. The limitation is
9 on the translation only.

10 I can quite understand that in some cases,
11 Mr. Justice Mansfield, the strict application of
12 that rule, strict conformity with that rule, would
13 lead to absurdities. The document may be an im-
14 mense document containing a lot of matter wholly
15 irrelevant, and you may have to give them the whole
16 lot, a copy of the lot. But, however, in a case
17 like that you should ask us to modify the rule, which
18 we may do. Under the rules we can modify the rules.
19 We will consider any application you may make to
20 modify the rule in this case; and I am sure you will
21 not make it.

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1 MR. JUSTICE MANSFIELD: If the Tribunal
2 please, I submit that the rule is qualified by
3 the statement that the document must be intended
4 to be adduced in evidence. Now, a document can
5 either be a whole of a book, or a whole of a se-
6 ries of pages, or one page from a series. And,
7 if we merely intend to adduce in evidence one ..
8 page, then that is a document which is intended
9 to be adduced in evidence. Secondly, there is
10 the overall provision that: except as otherwise
11 provided by the Tribunal.

Now, as far as this particular phase of the case is concerned, this preparation of Japanese opinion for war by education, and so on, the books from which we take our document or our extracts are voluminous; there are very few copies of them to be obtained. And if we have to provide twenty-six copies of the original book in Japanese, then it will take us some considerable time before we are able to do that.

21 In the circumstances, if that is the
22 Court's ruling with regard to this, I apply that
23 the Tribunal shall rule that, provided the whole
24 of the document is produced -- or the whole of
25 the book is produced to the Court, only copies

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1 of the parts which we have used in evidence shall
2 be required to be copied and served on the ac-
3 cused.

4 I ask the Tribunal to defer the final rul-
5 ing on this matter until the full text of the docu-
6 ments or the book upon which the prosecution
7 relies can be put before the Tribunal. I have
8 not them at my finger tips at the moment.

9 Furthermore, I will point out that the de-
10 fense include American and Japanese counsel; and,
11 if the original book is in Japanese, they are able
12 apparently to read it. If it is in English, the
13 American counsel can read it. So, there can be
14 no reason for the delivery, I submit, of a copy
15 to every Japanese and American counsel for the
16 defense.

17 THE PRESIDENT: We reserve considera-
18 tion of the whole matter, including a possible
19 review of the rules.

20 If counsel for the accused desire that
21 the witness stand down for cross-examination after
22 they have had an opportunity of reading the whole
23 of their book, we will accede to that.

24 MR. FURNESS: We have not got the books,
25 sir. If there is one copy here we cannot all

ITO

DIRECT

1 READ IT AT ONCE, SIR.

2 THE PRESIDENT: I simply say, if you de-
3 sire the witness to stand down for cross-examina-
4 tion until you peruse the book, we would agree
5 to your request.

6 MR. FURNESS: We do wish him to stand down.

7 (Whereupon, the witness was
8 excused)9 MR. DONIHI: If the Tribunal please,
10 the witness ITO will next be called for the
11 prosecution.12 MARSHALL OF THE COURT: Mr. President,
13 the witness ITO is now in court and will be sworn.

14 - - -

15 NOBUFUMI ITO, called as a witness on
16 behalf of the prosecution, being first duly
17 sworn, testified as follows:

18 DIRECT EXAMINATION

19 BY MR. DONIHI:

20 Q Will you state your name to the Tribunal,
21 please?

22 A ITO, Nobufumi.

23 Q I hand you herewith a document and ask
24 you if you have examined that document here-
25 before.

ITO

DIRECT

1 A There are typographical errors.
2 Q Have you seen that document before, Mr.
3 ITO?
4 A Yes, I have.
5 Q Is that your affidavit?
6 A It is.
7 Q Will you state what typographical er-
8 rors appear therein?
9 A The fourth line -- the fifth line of
10 the second paragraph, "the Third KONOYE Cabinet"
11 should read "the Second KONOYE Cabinet."
12 Q Is that the only typographical error
13 which appears in the document?
14 A That is all.
15 Q With that exception, Mr. ITO, are all of
16 the facts contained in that document true?
17 A It is as I have said.
18 Q Mr. ITO, do you understand English?
19 A Yes, I do.
20 Q Did you read that document when it was
21 first prepared?
22 A Yes, I did.
23 Q That is, the English copy of that document.
24 A Yes, I did.
25 Q And was that English written copy trans-

ITO

DIRECT

1 lated to you in Japanese?

2 A No, I have not yet seen the Japanese text.

3 MR. DONIHI: The prosecution, may it please
4 the Tribunal, will next in order offer in evidence
5 the affidavit of this witness, it being prosecution
6 document No. 11506.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Exhibit No. 142.

8 (Whereupon, the document above
9 referred to was marked prosecution's
10 exhibit No. 142 for identification.)

11 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted subject to
12 correction, of course.

13 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit
14 No. 142 was received in evidence.)

15 MR. SMITH: Your Honor made the ruling
16 before there was any opportunity to make any
17 objection. I would like to point out that the
18 affidavit, so called, contains practically nothing
19 in the way of facts as I read it. It consists in
20 the main of conclusions.

21 THE PRESIDENT: It is admitted for whatever
22 probative value it has.

23 MR. DONIHI: This document has been marked
24 "Exhibit No. 142."

25

ITO

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(Reading)

1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
2 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. }
3 - AGAINST - }
4 ARAKI, SADAO, et al. }
5 **A F F I D A V I T**

6 "I, ITO, Nobumitsu, do swear on my conscience
7 that the following is true:

8 "In 1936 the Commission of Information was es-
9 tablished by the Government for the purpose of
10 determining whether or not propaganda might
11 properly be disseminated from a central organ
12 rather than through the individual ministries.
13 As a result of the Commission's findings the Bu-
14reau of Information was established in 1936.

15 "In 1940 I became Chairman of the Bureau of
16 Information, which was later dissolved as the re-
17 sult of the establishment of the Board of Informa-
18 tion, of which I became the first president. The
19 Board of Information was established by the Third
20 KONOYE Cabinet and made a separate governmental
21 office with full powers to disseminate propaganda
22 for all ministries but leaving some powers within
23 the War and Navy Ministries to disseminate pro-
24 paganda and information on subject matter pecu-
25 liarily relating to military operations, plans

ITO

DIRECT

1 and strategic moves. The Board of Information
2 officially began functioning late in December
3 1940. Propaganda from all ministries cleared
4 through the Board of Information and was disseminated
5 to various newspapers, magazines, radio,
6 motion pictures and all other media of public
7 information. Censorship powers were also given
8 the Board of Information, but for practical pur-
9 poses the enforcement of all laws relating to
10 censorship in all its forms was administered
11 by the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry.

12 "In January of 1941 all publishers in Japan
13 were organized into the 'Japanese Publisher's As-
14 sociation', all book distributors were organized
15 into the 'Japanese Book and Magazine Distri-
16 butors Corporation', and all newspapers into the
17 'Japanese Newspaper League'. The establishment
18 of these organizations resulted in complete govern-
19 ment control of all information media included within
20 the respective groups. It was customary for
21 the organizations named to consult with the pre-
22 sident of the Board of Information before elect-
23 ing officials to head such organizations and to
24 receive the approval and suggestions of the Pre-
25 sident of the Board of Information as to who these

ITO

DIRECT

1 officials to be elected to such positions should be.

2 "Generally the propaganda disseminated through
3 the office of the Board of **Information** was of such
4 a nature in line with government policy as would
5 tend to justify Japan's position in world affairs
6 and in doing so prejudice the people of Japan
7 against potential enemies such as the United States
8 and Great Britain.

9 "As President of the Board of Information, I
10 was aware of the propaganda issued directly by
11 the War Ministry, such propaganda as issued by the
12 War Ministry being of an **inflammatory** nature for the
13 purpose of preparing the Japanese people for war
14 against the United States and Great Britain, pic-
15 turing these nations as the great obstacle to
16 Japan's progress in the Far East, and by this me-
17 thod inflaming the people against the United
18 States and Great Britain.

19 "As President of the Board of Information,
20 in order to best keep myself advised of govern-
21 ment policy in connection with my own official
22 duties, I had the right to sit in on all Cabinet
23 meetings but had no vote in the Cabinet."

24 Signed "ITO, Nobufumi."

25

ITO

DIRECT

1 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: Mr. President,
2 at this time I must inform the Tribunal that, in
3 contradiction to the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure,
4 6b (1), no Japanese copy of this affidavit was made
5 available to this section, and consequently we are
6 unable to give the Japanese translation thereof.

7 MR. DONIHI: I can only state to the Court
8 that I had been previously advised by the persons
9 in charge in our section that full distribution had
10 been made in accordance with the rules. I regret
11 sincerely that this has not been complied with.

12 (Whereupon, a document was handed
13 to the Language Section Chief.)

14 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: Mr. President,
15 we have now been supplied with such a copy and can
16 now read the Japanese with the Tribunal's consent.

17 THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity you didn't
18 ask the counsel now speaking before you made this
19 report to us.

20 | LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: Yes, sir.

21 MR. DONIHI: I have no objection for
22 prosecution, your Honor.

23 | Defense may take the witness.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSÉ.

ITO

CROSS

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY DR. KIYOSE:

Q When did you become President of the Board of Information, and when did you resign?

5 A I was appointed to that position some
6 time in December, 1940, and I remained in the same
7 up to the 18th of November, 1941.

8 MONITOR: Correction: Not "I was
9 appointed," but "I was appointed until that period."

10 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: Further correction:
11 "November" should read "October."

12 Q A very important statement in your
13 affidavit says that the War Ministry disseminated
14 propaganda prejudicing the people of Japan against
15 potential enemies such as the United States and
16 Great Britain. But, from when was this propaganda
17 begun?

18 A As far as I understand, that kind of
19 propaganda was conducted from May or June, 1941 up
20 to the time I resigned from the post.

21 Q Did you, yourself, as President of the
22 Board, do this propaganda, or did you cause others
23 to do this?

24 A As you can see in my affidavit, I only
25 recognized that I know of the existence of such

ITO

CROSS

1 propaganda and was not responsible for conducting
2 such propaganda myself nor ordering other people
3 to do so.

4 Q However, in your affidavit you say that
5 propaganda was cleared through the Board of Infor-
6 mation. If it was not you who did this, who was it
7 that did this?

8 THE MONITOR: Correction: Either you had
9 to do it or your subordinates had to do it. If it
10 went through the Board of Information, it had to be
11 that way.

12 A As it is stated in my affidavit, the Board
13 of Information was not given the full right to con-
14 duct the propaganda. Matters such as matters con-
15 cerning military or matters concerning the Supreme
16 Command were excluded from the powers of the Board
17 of Information.

18 Q In the third paragraph before the end of
19 your affidavit you say that "Generally the propaganda
20 disseminated" et cetera, and there is no mention
21 made of the Supreme Command or any other such thing.

22 A As it was a governmental office, it in-
23 cluded everything that a government could do. The
24 propaganda that I referred to in paragraph three
25 meant, in my opinion, all the propaganda that the

ITO

CROSS

1 government could conduct at that time and not which
2 do not include items which are not allowed for the
3 government. The Cabinet at that time did not have --
4 the government itself did not have the right to
5 decide on matters of military command -- military
6 operations and Supreme Command.

7 THE PRESIDENT: The Court will now ~~recess~~
8 until thirty minutes after one.

9 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was
10 taken.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess,
at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: The conditions of heat in this courtroom are causing great discomfort to one of my colleagues who will decline to sit if this lighting is continued at its present intensity. I want those lights to be reduced to a minimum.

Dr. KIYOSÉ.

DR. KIYOSÉ: With the Court's permission,
I shall continue the morning's cross-examination.

— 1 —

N O B U F U M I I T O , called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows:

BY DR. KIYOSÉ (Continued):

Q In the third paragraph of this affidavit the witness has stated that powers were left to the War and Navy Ministries to disseminate propaganda and information on subject matter peculiarly relating to military operations, plans, and strategic moves.

ITO

CROSS

1 A The question is not clear. May I have it re-
2 peated?

3 Q You have, concerning the powers of the Board
4 of information -- you have stated that matters con-
5 cerning military operations, plans, and strategic
6 moves were not within the power of the Board of In-
7 formation, and were left to the War and Navy Minis-
8 tries, is that correct?

9 A It is correct.

10 Q However, in the fourth paragraph you state:
11 "Generally the propaganda disseminated through the
12 office of the Board of Information was of such a
13 nature in line with government policy as would tend
14 to justify Japan's position in world affairs and in
15 doing so prejudice the people of Japan against po-
16 tential enemies such as the United States and Great
17 Britain."

18 If this is correct, it must follow that it was
19 within your power to disseminate such propaganda,
20 that is, propaganda against potential enemies such
21 as the United States and Great Britain. What is
22 your interpretation of the above paragraph?

23 A The meaning of what I set forth in my affi-
24 davit is that the Board of Information functioned
25 within specially circumscribed limits, and that

ITO

CROSS

1 it was to interpret and to defend Japanese policy
2 in the light of the world situation, and I so
3 stated that, objectively viewed, such a result
4 came about with respect to so-called potential
5 enemies."

6 Q Did you do this on your own responsibility?

7 A May I make this distinction: That this
8 was the result of the policy and not what I had
9 intended to do.

10 Q Did you believe that the United States and
11 Great Britain were "potential enemies"?

12 A At that time I did not think so, but it was
13 possible to think that such a result would follow
14 such a policy.

15 Q During your tenure as President of the
16 Board of Information, that is, from the end of 1940
17 to October of 1941, our country was continuing
18 negotiations with the United States through Ambas-
19 sadors NOMURA and KURUSU. We cannot believe that
20 while these negotiations were going on we, as Presi-
21 dent of the Board of Information, could pursue such
22 a policy as would result in making potential ene-
23 mies of the United States and Great Britain. Do you
24 have any explanation to give of this?

25 THE MONITOR: Correction: From the end of

ITO

CROSS

1940 until October, 1941.

1 A That requires some explanation, and I shall
2 make it briefly. At that time, during my tenure of
3 office, my task, as President of the Board of Infor-
4 mation, was to give publicity to the national policy,
5 of Japan. It was as a result of that national
6 policy, if viewed objectively, that such a situa-
7 tion was brought about, that is, to consider the
8 United States and Great Britain as potential ene-
9 mies.
10

11 THE MONITOR: Correction: And as the
12 President of the Board it was my task to let the
13 world know that policy.

14 Q When the Board of Information disseminated
15 propaganda abroad and at home, did it not do so in
16 accordance with a policy already drawn up?

17 A Such a plan or policy sometimes has been
18 made and sometimes not made. It has not always
19 followed a fixed rule.

20 Q When such a plan or policy was made up,
21 who was responsible for it?

22 A When made, it would be the responsibility
23 of myself, the President of the Board.

24 Q Then, did you admit that these policies
25 drawn up under your responsibility succeeded in

ITO

CROSS

1 making America and Great Britain potential ene-
2 mies at a time when relations with these two coun-
3 tries were extremely delicate?

4 A As I have said before, when an outline of
5 policy or a plan of policy has been made, it has
6 not been made with the idea of making of the United
7 States and Britain potential enemies, but such a
8 result came about as a result of the policy.

9 THE MONITOR: Correction: When this was
10 carried out.

11 Q "To justify Japan's position in world af-
12 fairs, we are doing so to prepare the people of
13 Japan against enemies such as the United States
14 and Britain." Then what you say now is very dif-
15 ferent from what you have said in your affidavit.
16 In the English text of the affidavit, it is
17 written "in line with government policy as would
18 tend to justify Japan's position in world affairs
19 and in doing so prejudice the people of Japan
20 against potential enemies such as the United States
21 and Great Britain." Do you now support what you
22 wrote in your affidavit, or do you take it back?

23 A What I have written is as set forth in the
24 affidavit. If my explanations do not coincide with
25 that, it might be proper to make such revisions or

ITO

CROSS

1 modifications, but I wish to state at this time
2 that when I wrote the affidavit it was with what
3 I have already said in mind.

4 Q Since you say that what is in this affi-
5 davit is the meaning of what is in this affidavit ,
6 it is not as would appear from the words, but as
7 you have just interpreted them now, I shall ac-
8 cept that explanation and proceed to my next
9 question.

10 You have said: that propaganda, such as would
11 result in making England and America enemies. Just
12 what kind of propaganda do you mean by this?

13 A That relates to the question of the con-
14 struction of the Co-prosperity Sphere.

15 Q Mr. ITO, the phrase "Co-prosperity Sphere"
16 was not yet used in 1941. Has your memory played
17 tricks with you?

18 A If my memory is correct, I think the term,
19 "Co-prosperity Sphere," began to be used from about
20 August, 1940, at the time of the installation of
21 the second KONOYE Cabinet, and because of that,
22 this phrase gained currency during my tenure of
23 office.

24 Q As it is I that I am questioning you, I
25 shall say no more on the subject, but the word

ITO

CROSS

1 actually used by the Board of Information was the
2 construction of the new order in East Asia, and
3 not the construction of the Co-prosperity Sphere.
4 I shall now turn to my next question.

5 A May I say that the term, "Co-prosperity
6 Sphere," was not coined by the Board of Informa-
7 tion, but the term began to be used as an expres-
8 sion of the policy of the second KONOYE Cabinet.

9 Q Have you disseminated any other propa-
10 ganda which would result in making enemies of
11 Great Britain and the United States?

12 A When I wrote the affidavit I was thinking
13 only of that question.

14 Q Of course, the idea of the construction of
15 the Co-prosperity Sphere would be very different
16 from idea held in the United States and in Britain,
17 but would such an idea result in making our people
18 think of the United States and Great Britain as
19 enemies?

20 A That is a way of thinking. I can't say
21 one way or the other. That depends on a person's
22 private interpretation.

23 Q If I remember your propaganda, in those
24 days you said that Japan intended to construct a
25 new order in East Asia. She was perfectly willing

ITO

CROSS

1 for Great Britain and the United States to make
2 a democratic world of their own in their own sphere,
3 and in Russia and in Europe, and that Russia and
4 the countries of Europe should live in their own
5 world, in accordance with their own history and
6 culture, and that the idea of the Co-prosperity
7 Sphere was not to make enemies of the United States
8 and of Russia, but to enable each nation to have
9 its own place in the sun.

10 A It is as you have just explained. In
11 carrying out that policy we did not consider the
12 United States or Britain as potential enemies; but,
13 because of the prevailing objective situation,
14 such a situation or such a question developed.
15 That is because the idea of the Co-prosperity
16 Sphere was not approved of or supported by the
17 United States or Britain.

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ITO

CROSS

1 Q You have just said that your propaganda
2 which resulted in making enemies of Great Britain
3 and America had as its real objective no such purpose
4 but was simply the construction of a new order or a
5 Co-prosperity Sphere in East Asia. As I think this
6 is a very important point I would like you to repeat
7 your answer; that is, can you definitely affirm
8 that the purpose of the construction of the Co-
9 prosperity Sphere was not to make enemies of England,
10 America, the Soviet Union and China, but rather to
11 be friends with them?

12 A As I have frequently explained and now that
13 I have been asked again to answer, I shall repeat
14 that the motive or the desire or the purpose of the
15 publicity given to the idea of the Co-prosperity
16 Sphere was to give effect to the theme, to give
17 every nation and people their proper place in the
18 sun. Its intention, I say definitely, I affirm
19 definitely, was not at all to make potential enemies
20 of any country.

THE MONITOR: Correction: "Great Britain
and United States."

23 Q Then I shall go to the next problem. You
24 say that questions covering the Supreme Command --
25 questions covering information regarding the Supreme

ITO

CROSS

1 Command were outside the scope of the Board of
2 Information but just what type of information do
3 you mean by this?

4 A As I have written down in my affidavit,
5 the items which were outside the jurisdiction of the
6 Board of Information related to "military operations,
7 plans and strategic moves." However, there were
8 other items besides that.

9 Q Then since you say it was information per-
10 taining to military operations, plans and strategic
11 moves, matters of policy then do not come under this
12 scope, do they?

13 A That depends upon the interpretation of
14 the term "policy." I should like to know what your
15 interpretation of "policy" means. Upon your inter-
16 pretation, I may have something to say.

17 Q Then I shall reframe my question. By matters
18 pertaining to the Supreme Command, I understand you
19 to mean military operations and information regarding
20 the result of battles. For instance, any future moves
21 our country or our army might make were not covered
22 within this limit, or were they?

23 A Relative to future actions if they are
24 related to military matters, they, of course, would
25 come under the same category.

ITO

CROSS

1 Q I was not questioning you on that. My
2 question was that in reality and not in theory,
3 did not the Supreme Command cover items other than
4 mere military moves and results of battles?

5 A As your question itself puts it, when I
6 mentioned military moves, et cetera, I meant that
7 the "et cetera" part of it would also cover those
8 items.

9 Q Then I would like to hear if in reality
10 there is any example of the Board having disseminated
11 any information regarding such future moves by the
12 army or by the state?

13 A In my recollection there are none.

14 Q One last question. Did you write this
15 affidavit in English or in Japanese?

16 A I replied to the affidavit in English.

17 Q Then in the third paragraph of your affidavit
18 you have said that "laws relating to censorship" were
19 "administered by the Police Bureau of the Home Min-
20 istry." What do you mean by this in Japanese?

21 A By that I mean the Police Bureau of the
22 Ministry of Home Affairs.

23 DR. KIYOSÉ: Mr. President, the Japanese text
24 of this affidavit, instead of giving the term "Police
25 Bureau" has the term "Metropolitan Police Board."

ITO

CROSS

1 Q Well, putting that matter aside, this
2 question of censorship by the Police Bureau was
3 administered in reality by the Fourth Section of
4 your own Bureau and was even housed in the same
5 building as yourself?

6 A It is as you say.

7 Q Then you cannot disclaim responsibility
8 for matters relating to censorship either, can you?

9 A I cannot say that I am completely not
10 responsible. However, I should like to say that it
11 was not a matter under my own charge.

12 Q I did not hear the first part of your
13 answer.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Get it from the shorthand
15 reporter.

16 INTERPRETER: To which Mr. ITO replied again
17 in the same words he had given before.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Give it to him in Japanese.

19 INTERPRETER: Mr. President, the question was
20 solved.

21 THE PRESIDENT: All right. Any further cross-
22 examination?

23 MR. YAMAOKA: Mr. President, no further cross-
24 examination by American counsel.

25 THE PRESIDENT: That will do, witness.

ITO
IKESHIMACROSS
DIRECT

1 Do you want to re-examine him?

2 MR. DONIHI: No, your Honor, the prosecution
3 does not desire to re-examine the witness.4 (Whereupon, the witness was
5 excused.)6 MR. DONIHI: Next in order, may it please
7 the Tribunal, the prosecution desires to have the
8 witness OGATA called.9 May it please the Tribunal, this witness
10 is not present in the witness room and the prosecution
11 will examine first the witness IKESHIMA.

12 - - -

13 S H I G E N O B U I K E S H I M A, called as a
14 witness on behalf of the prosecution, being
15 first duly sworn, testified as follows:

16 DIRECT EXAMINATION

17 BY MR. DONIHI:

18 Q Will you state your name to the Tribunal,
19 please?

20 A IKESHIMA, Shigenobu.

21 Q I hand you herewith an affidavit, a document,
22 and ask you if you can identify that as your affi-
23 davit?

24 A I confirm this affidavit as my own.

25 Q Do you read English, Mr. IKESHIMA?

IKESHIMA

DIRECT

1 A I can read but I cannot speak English.

2 Q In reading this affidavit, the English in
3 this affidavit, were you able to determine the con-
4 tents thereof?

5 A I could understand.

6 Q And are all of the statements contained
7 therein true and correct?

8 A I think they are accurate.

9 Q Before signing this affidavit, was it first
10 translated from English into Japanese for you?

11 A I had it so translated.

12 Q Were the facts as translated to you true and
13 correct?

14 A It was not translated to me in writing but
15 in speech. From what I heard, the contents were ac-
16 curate.

17 MR. DONIHI: May it please the Tribunal, the
18 prosecution will next in order ask to introduce the
19 affidavit of this witness.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted.

21 ("Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit
22 No. 143 was received in evidence.)

23 MR. DONIHI: "International Military Tribunal
24 for the Far East --" May I have the exhibit number,
25 please?

IKESHIMA.

DIRECT

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: 143.

2 MR. DONIHI: (Reading)

3 "INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
4 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)5 - AGAINST -) A F F I D A V I T
6 ARAKI, SADAO, et al.)7 "I, IKESHIMA, Shigenobu, do swear on my con-
8 science that the following is true:9 "I am presently a Professor at Hosei University
10 and in such capacity teach Cultural Politics, which
11 subject relates to the history of civilization. I
12 have been engaged in teaching this subject for the
13 past year, and previous thereto was engaged in teach-
14 ing language.15 "I was educated in the schools of Japan, begin-
16 ning with the elementary schools and finishing with
17 the university. As a student in the Japanese schools,
18 and later as a professor, I am familiar with the var-
19 ious subjects that were taught from the elementary
20 schools up to and including the universities. There
21 was some military training in the lower grade schools
22 following the Japanese-Chinese War of 1896. In 1922
23 following the demobilization of some of the Japanese
24 Army, regular Army officers were sent by the War Min-
25 istry to the various schools to teach military training

IKESHIMA.

DIRECT

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: 143.

2 MR. DONIHI: (Reading)

3 "INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
4 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)

5 - AGAINST -

6 A F F I D A V I T

7 ARAKI, SADAO, et al.

8 "I, IKESHIMA, Shigenobu, do swear on my con-
science that the following is true:9 "I am presently a Professor at Hosei University
10 and in such capacity teach Cultural Politics, which
11 subject relates to the history of civilization. I
12 have been engaged in teaching this subject for the
13 past year, and previous thereto was engaged in teach-
14 ing language.15 "I was educated in the schools of Japan, begin-
16 ning with the elementary schools and finishing with
17 the university. As a student in the Japanese schools,
18 and later as a professor, I am familiar with the var-
19 ious subjects that were taught from the elementary
20 schools up to and including the universities. There
21 was some military training in the lower grade schools
22 following the Japanese-Chinese War of 1896. In 1922
23 following the demobilization of some of the Japanese
24 Army, regular Army officers were sent by the War Min-
25 istry to the various schools to teach military training

IKESHIMA

DIRECT

1 and subjects. This military training and teaching
2 did not require very much school time of the students
3 until 1925 when such training and teaching commenced
4 to absorb more school time up to and until the Man-
5 churian Incident. Following the Manchurian Incident,
6 time devoted by the students to military training and
7 teaching dropped a little until 1936 when this sub-
8 ject again became important and more time of the
9 student was devoted to these subjects. This mil-
10 itary training program consisted of drilling, physi-
11 cal culture exercises, war games, and textbooks used
12 in the schools to arouse patriotism in the students,
13 and which textbooks were devoted to the subjects of
14 wars that Japan had been in, and battles.

15 "Preceding the Manchurian Incident there were
16 attempts made to oppose the military program in the
17 schools on the part of some of the students and
18 teachers, but after the Manchurian Incident the
19 ultra-nationalistic and militaristic spirit teaching
20 came to the front. Shortly before the Manchurian
21 Incident the students were taught that Manchuria was
22 the lifeline of Japan and that control of Manchuria
23 was necessary to establish a stable economic order.

24 "After the China Incident, because of pressure
25 from the War Ministry, ultra-nationalistic and

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1 "militaristic thoughts were inculcated in the stu-
2 dents under the supervision of the military in the
3 schools. In 1937 when Marquis KIDO was Minister of
4 Education, the school system was reorganized and more
5 school time was devoted to military training and
6 teaching of military subjects, this training and
7 teaching becoming even more important when General
8 ARAKI succeeded Marquis KIDO as Minister of Education.
9 Beginning in the early part of 1941, the students
10 were taught that the future (failure) of the Japan-
11 ese Army to conquer China was because of the assis-
12 tance which the United States and Great Britain were
13 rendering China, the students being impressed with
14 the idea that for this reason the great enemy of
15 Japan was not China but the United States and Great
16 Britain.
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"Previous to assuming my professorship at Hosei University, that is from April 1935 until March, 1938, I was engaged as an employee of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. The Japan Broadcasting Corporation was controlled by the government through the Ministry of Communications. Such method of control was one of censorship which was effected by the Ministry of Communications by the requirements that all broadcasting scripts be first censored in the Ministry of Communications before released to the public. Such censorship has been in effect since 1925 when the Japan Broadcasting Corporation was formed. It was the custom and policy of the corporation and the Japanese government alike to have officials of the various ministry make broadcasts on matters of policy relating to said ministries, this practice being followed by the War Ministry most frequently.

"All persons in Japan were forbidden to own or have in their possession short-wave radio sets or to listen to foreign broadcasts. The Japan Broadcasting Corporation was and is the only broadcasting system in Japan.

"In 1940 when the Board of Information was established, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation was

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1 advised by said Board of Information as to what in-
2 formation might be released to the public and as to
3 the manner in which such information should be treated.

4 "During the time that I was employed by the
5 Japan Broadcasting Corporation, I listened to many
6 broadcasts made by officials of the War Ministry,
7 these broadcasts all being of a propaganda nature.
8 Following the China Incident in 1937, broadcasts
9 made by officials of the War Ministry to the Japan-
10 ese public were all of such a nature as to explain
11 and justify Japan's position in connection with
12 China."

13 Signed: "IKESHIMA, Shigenobu."

14 The defense may cross-examine.

15 MR. BROOKS: There is a question on that
16 record, Mr. President. The reading in paragraph
17 five, the word "future" I think was read instead of
18 the word "failure." The word is "failure" of the
19 Japanese Army instead of the "future."

20 THE PRESIDENT: That is noted.

21 MR. HOZUMI: If the Court please, I should
22 like to have a very short cross-examination. My
23 point is only one.

24

25

IKESHIMA

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CROSS-EXAMINATION

1 BY MR. HOZUMI:

2
3 Q In your affidavit you state in 1937, when
4 Marquis KIDO was Minister of Education, the school
5 system was reorganized and more school time was
6 devoted to military training and teaching of military
7 subjects. Is this something of which you yourself
8 were directly informed?

9 A At that time I was in the Broadcasting Cor-
10 poration of Japan but, I was not informed of that
11 directly.

12 Q Why, then, have you testified to facts
13 which you did not hear directly?

14 A At that time I was attached to the cultural
15 section of the broadcasting company, and such infor-
16 mation was brought to my attention.

17 Q Then can I consider this part is hearsay
18 evidence?

19 A Yes, you may view it as such.

20 Q Then in this hearsay evidence you have said
21 that more school time was devoted, et cetera. Just
22 how many hours was this school time increased?

23 A I don't recall exactly.

24 Q Then don't you also know what type of military
25 subjects were increased?

IKESHIMA

CROSS

1 A According to my recollection, I feel as
2 I heard that field exercises and maneuvers were
3 increased.

4 Q That is also something which you heard
5 from other people, isn't it?

6 A Yes. That is correct.

7 MR. HOZUMI: Thank you.

9 BY MR. FURNESS:

10 Q Mr. IKESHIMA, I assume that you had, before
11 signing this affidavit, several interviews with the
12 prosecution. Is that correct?

13 A I have.

14 (Whereupon, MORI, Tomio replaced
15 OKA, Takashi as interpreter.)

16 Q You were asked questions in English or in
17 Japanese?

18 A The questions were put to me in English and
19 then translated through an interpreter.

20 Q Then, at those interviews there were present
21 an interrogator who asked you questions in English
22 and an interpreter who interpreted it into Japanese.
23 Was there also a stenographer who took down your
24 answers?

23 A That is correct.

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CROSS

1 Q Were you at any time shown a copy of the
2 questions and answers in writing?

3 A I read it only at the time I signed the
4 affidavit.

5 Q The affidavit is not in question and answer
6 form. Were you ever shown any paper which had on
7 it the questions which were asked you and the answers
8 which you, yourself, gave?

9 A No, no.

10 Q Then subsequent to these interviews at which
11 you were asked questions and gave answers, there was
12 prepared for your signature this affidavit. Is that
13 correct?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Was it first presented to you in draft
16 form or as a finished document?

17 A As a final or complete or official docu-
18 ment.

19 Q Then this affidavit that you signed is not
20 in your own words but in the words of the prosecution
21 who presented it to you. Is that correct?

22 A Before affixing my signature to the docu-
23 ment, the contents therein was explained to me, and
24 I was told that if there were any points to be
25 changed or corrected that I was free to do so. However,

IKESHIMA

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1 as there were no parts requiring revision, I approved
2 of it as a summary of what I had wished to say.

3 Q But, regardless of whether it was the truth
4 or not, the wording of this affidavit is the wording
5 of the person who drafted it and presented it to you.
6 Is that correct?

7 MR. DONIHI: If your Honor please, I can
8 see no possible good to come of an answer in either
9 direction. No matter what the witness may say in
10 answer to that question there can be no enlightening
11 material or anything of benefit to the Court, and it
12 is an offensive type of question.

13 THE PRESIDENT: The purpose is to show that
14 the answers were obtained by leading questions which
15 would not have been allowed in Court. That goes to
16 diminish the value of the affidavit, and the defense
17 are entitled to get anything they can out of the
18 witness in that regard.

19 MR. FURNESS: Has he answered? If he wants
20 the question read back, I will request --

21 THE WITNESS: Please.

22 (Whereupon, the last question was
23 repeated by the interpreter.)

24 A That I do not admit; that I do not acknowledge.

25 Q But it is true that you did not draft this

affidavit. Is that correct?

1 A That I do acknowledge.

2 Q Were you told by the interrogator at these
3 interviews what information he was seeking from you?

4 A Yes, I heard.

5 Q And you gave that information. Is that
6 correct?

7 A That, I think, is correct.

8 THE PRESIDENT: I suggest it is not worth
9 following this up to any great extent, Major.

10 MR. FURNESS: I have one more question, sir.

11 Q Did you give the interrogator any information,
12 in answer to their questions, which is not included
13 in this affidavit?

14 A I haven't given anything outside of the
15 facts which are mentioned in the affidavit.

16 MR. FURNESS: That is all.

17 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
18 fifteen minutes.

19 (Whereupon, at 1450, a recess was
20 taken until 1505, after which the proceed-
21 ings were resumed as follows, Japanese into
22 English and English into Japanese interpre-
23 tation being made by OKA, Takashi and
24 TSUCHIYA, Jun, Lanny Miyamoto acting as
25 Monitor:)

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1 DEPUTY MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Interna-
2 tional Military Tribunal for the Far East is now
3 resumed.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.

5 DR. KIYOSE: I have one simple question to
6 ask.

7 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

8 BY DR. KIYOSE:

9 Q In this affidavit you have said that in
10 1938 you were working in the Japan Broadcasting
11 Corporation until 1938, and that from 1938 you re-
12 signed and became a professor at Hosei University,
13 is that correct?

14 A I did not go to Hosei University immediate-
15 ly after my resignation.

16 Q Is that so? In any case, you did resign
17 from the broadcasting corporation in 1938, didn't
18 you? In your affidavit, in the second paragraph
19 before the last paragraph, you say:

20 "In 1940 when the Board of Information was
21 established, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation was
22 advised by said Board of Information as to what
23 information might be released to the public and as
24 to the manner in which such information should be
25 treated."

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CROSS

1 Is that correct?

2 THE MONITOR: 1940, two years later, 1940.

3 A As I recall, the Board of Information was
4 established in December, 1940. After that, in the
5 field of radio broadcasting the policy changed from
6 that of passive control or supervision to that of
7 positive guidance. Of this I heard directly from
8 the personnel working in the broadcasting corpora-
9 tion as well as from various reading matter.

10 Q Then, since this is already two years after
11 you resigned from the Japan Broadcasting Corporation,
12 all this information is what is known among lawyers
13 as hearsay, is that not so?

14 A It is so.

15 Q How old are you?

16 A I am 43.

17 Q In the third paragraph of your affidavit you
18 say that there was some military training in the low-
19 er grade schools following the Japanese-Chinese War
20 of 1896. This, then, would be when you were still
21 a very small baby, and this also, then, is something
22 that you have heard from other people; is that not
23 so?

24 A It is knowledge based upon written material.

25 Q From what did you study this?

IKESHIMA

CROSS

1 A Primary school textbooks in use at the time
2 I was going to the primary school.

3 Q Primary school textbooks, did you say?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Is there any mention made of military train-
6 ing in secondary schools and in lower schools in
7 these textbooks you mention? ?

8 A The word "military training" has been
9 mentioned, and that was interpreted to be the
10 disciplining of marshal thought or military train-
11 ing of very ancient origin, as in use from very an-
12 cient times.

13 Q After the Sino-Japanese War, the term
14 "military training" was used only in schools above
15 middle schools, and this term was not used in
16 grade schools. However, you say that you have
17 studied these facts in textbooks used in grade
18 schools. How can you say such a thing? You may
19 correct your previous statement if you wish to.

20 A To explain myself, in primary school text-
21 books and also in teaching material quite a large
22 portion of such materials are devoted to such sub-
23 jects as the story of military heroism.

24 Q Then, do you correct your previous state-
25 ment that you know that military training was --

IKESHIMA

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1 there was military training in grade schools from the
2 lower school textbooks?

3 A I shall correct myself in the statement in
4 which I said that I had obtained such knowledge from
5 textbooks in my primary school years.

6 DR. KIYOSÉ: That is all I have to say.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. McManus.

8 MR. McMANUS: If the Tribunal pleases, I
9 shall endeavor to be very brief.

10 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

11 BY MR. McMANUS:

12 Q Mr. IKESHIMA, I note that you say after
13 the China Incident, because of the pressure of the
14 War Ministry, military training became more inten-
15 sive. Now, besides this pressure, were not the
16 policies for this training formulated and set by
17 the War Ministry?

18 A Do you mean the China Incident?

19 Q I beg your pardon?

20 A Do you mean the China Incident?

21 Q No. I mean, were the policies for this
22 military training formulated and set by the War
23 Ministry?

24 A No, I know nothing of this.

25 Q Well, you were not present at any of these

IKESHIMA

CROSS

1 meetings where this new policy was formulated for
2 intensive military training, were you?

3 A No.

4 Q And what you are testifying to concerning
5 the policies of military training is what you have
6 heard from others and purely hearsay, is that
7 correct?

8 A Yes, it is what I have heard from students
9 and also my fellow professors.

10 MR. McMANUS: No further questions.

11 MR. DONIHI: The prosecution does not desire
12 to examine this witness further.

13 THE PRESIDENT: You may leave, Witness.

14 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

15 MR. DONIHI: Mr. President, at this time the
16 prosecution would like to call Mr. SAKI, Akio as a
17 witness.

18 DEPUTY MARSHAL OF THE COURT: Mr. President,
19 the witness is in court and will now be sworn.

20 - - -

21 A K I O S A K I, called as a witness on behalf
22 of the prosecution, being first duly sworn,
23 testified as follows:

24

25

SAKI

DIRECT

1 DIRECT EXAMINATION

2 BY MR. DONIHI:

3 Q Will you state your name to the Court,
4 please?

5 A I am SAKI, Akio.

6 Q I hand you herewith an affidavit and ask
7 you to examine it and determine whether you have
8 seen this affidavit previously?

9 A There is no mistake.

10 Q Do you read English, Mr. SAKI?

11 A I can, but not very well.

12 Q Do you read well enough to have determined
13 the facts contained in the affidavit which you have
14 just stated is one that you have previously seen?

15 A Yes, I do.

16 Q Before signing this affidavit, was it first
17 translated from English into Japanese for you?

18 A No, I read it in English.

19 Q Did you find all of the facts contained
20 therein to be true and correct before signing said
21 affidavit?

22 A Yes, I understood it to be so.

23 Q And this document which you have just exam-
24 ined, is that then the affidavit which you signed?

25 A Yes.

SAKI

DIRECT

1 MR. DONIHI: May it please the Tribunal,
2 the prosecution next in order tenders the affi-
3 davit of this witness in evidence.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Exhibit 144 marked in
5 evidence.

6 (Whereupon, the document above
7 referred to was marked prosecution's ex-
8 hibit No. 144 in evidence.)

9 MR. DONIHI. "International Military Tribunal
10 for the Far East. The United States of America, et al,
11 against ARAKI, Sadao, et al. Affidavit.

12 "I, SAKI, Akio, do swear on my conscience
13 that the following is true:

14 "I am President of the Nihon Kamishibai
15 Association. My company manufactures what are
16 known as paper theater productions. Such produc-
17 tions are prepared on large picture cards with a
18 story on the back of each, there being 20 cards
19 to the set. These card sets were made for sale
20 and distribution to travelling candy vendors, who
21 would use the cards in attracting crowds as an
22 aid in the sale of their production, and to
23 teachers and nurses for use in entertaining and
24 educating children and grownups alike.

25 "Following the China Incident, card sets

SAKI

DIRECT

1 and stories to match became popular--or, gradually
2 of an ultra-nationalistic and militaristic nature,
3 sets of this type being manufactured upon instruc-
4 tions from the Government.

5 "In July 1941 upon instructions from the
6 Imperial Rule Assistance Association, my company
7 manufactured a set of cards, the story for which
8 was supplied by the Imperial Rule Assistance Asso-
9 ciation, the set being entitled *Japan is Now*
10 *Fighting!* (Senso Shita Irunoda). This set, of
11 which many thousand copies were made, depicts
12 United States and Great Britain as being responsible
13 for the China War, and that China and Japan must
14 join hands, and Japan must join Italy and Germany
15 to fight the United States. This particular set
16 is a typical example of the type of card sets being
17 manufactured for the government at this time. A
18 copy of this set is International Prosecution Docu-
19 ment No. 7117.

20 "Following the China Incident, the Kamishi-
21 bai became popular with adults as well as children
22 and was used to a very great extent in the schools
23 of Japan."

24 Signed "Akio SAKI."

25

SAKI

DIRECT

W 1 Q Mr. SAKI. I hand you herewith prosecution's
O 2 document 7117, and ask you to examine it. Have you
l 3 examined the document, Mr. SAKI?
f
&
S 4 A Yes, I have.
p 5 Q Is that document the set which you have re-
r 6 ferred to in your affidavit as "Kamishibai," en-
t 7 titled "Japan is now fighting"?
a
A 8 Yes, it is.
t
9 MR. DONIHI: If the Tribunal please, at
10 this time the prosecution would like to offer in
11 evidence the document 7117 as an exhibit to this
12 witness's testimony.
13

14 (Whereupon, the document above
15 referred to was marked prosecution's ex-
16 hibit No. 145 for identification.)
17

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted.
18

(Whereupon, prosecution's ex-
19 hibit No. 145 was received in evidence.)
20

MR. FURNESS: Is that a set of cards, just
21 for the record here?
22

DONIHI: Yes, it is a set of cards, with
23 writing on the back of the cards.
24

MR. FURNESS: Have you submitted to us a
25 set of cards? I don't think we have seen them?
26

MR. DONIHI: We were informed by our
27

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1 authorities who were to send them down, and I
2 checked with one of our counsel a few moments ago
3 who advised me that such a distribution of this
4 document had been made.

5 MR. FURNESS: We have a written document,
6 but we have not got the cards.

7 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I
8 have never seen a copy of that. The three affi-
9 davits delivered this morning to our office at
10 eight o'clock were two of the affidavits that were
11 just read. I had a half an hour to look at them,
12 and I have not seen this whatsoever. It was a
13 record that they were to deliver to our office
14 at eight o'clock, record's office; they were de-
15 livered to my office at nine. I would like the
16 rules to be complied with as much as possible.
17 I would like to have a chance to examine this,
18 if possible, and discuss with counsel the questions
19 to be asked.

20 THE PRESIDENT: In fairness to the defense,
21 the cross-examination of this witness on those
22 cards might be postponed until tomorrow morning.
23 This will enable substantial compliance with the
24 rules.

25 MR. JUSTICE MANSFIELD: If the Tribunal

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1 please, the International Prosecution records show
2 that these affidavits, which, as have just been said,
3 were not received by one of the counsel until this
4 morning, was delivered in English on the 17th of
5 this month and delivered in Japanese on the 18th
6 of this month, and the receipt is held in the prosecu-
7 tion section for that particular document. The
8 fact that their administrative section has not de-
9 livered it is no fault of the prosecution. I will
10 have this checked. I understand that these docu-
11 ments have also been delivered well outside the
12 time required by the rules, and there has been, I
13 understand, but I will have it checked, not only a sub-
14 stantial but an actual compliance with the rules of
15 the Court.

16 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, on that
17 point, I discussed with the distinguished counsel
18 for the prosecution this very matter, and I have
19 his record, that it states in his record that they
20 were delivered at 1410, the 17th of June, in English,
21 and at 4:30, the 18th of June, in Japanese; but our
22 records, where they came down and got the receipts,
23 shows 0800, June 20, on both Japanese and English,
24 and I checked with Mr. KIYOSE on the Japanese, and
25 that was this morning, was the first he saw of

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1 these records, and I am sure that is the first
2 time I have had it, and that is the way the record
3 stands. I can bring the record into court, if
4 necessary. I said I would not raise this point if
5 the copy complies in the future with the Charter
6 and rules, and it has not been so in the picture
7 deal. I do not know what they are. I would like
8 to see them and examine them.

9 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, maybe
10 I can make an explanation and straighten this things
11 out so that we can proceed and save time. The docu-
12 ment, 7117, which we have, is an explanation ap-
13 parently of a legend of a script that appears on
14 the back of a set of cards, which is explained in
15 the affidavit, which is document 11508 just intro-
16 duced as exhibit No. 144. I have both explanation
17 and the affidavit. I understand, from the prosecu-
18 tion table, that the set of cards were not delivered,
19 or they thought they had been delivered, but of
20 course we did not receive them. I think if de-
21 fense counsel understood what it is that those
22 cards actually appear to be -- real evidence rather
23 than documentary evidence, in the true sense of the
24 word, perhaps they would not object if they under-
25 stand what it is.

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DIRECT

1 MR. DONIHI: May it please the Tribunal,
2 we cannot state that this document has not been
3 delivered. However, in view of the fact that there
4 has been some confusion, obviously, the prosecution
5 is quite willing to determine that these defense
6 counsel have copies of the document in their hands
7 by morning, if it would be in keeping with the idea
8 and thought of the Court.

9 THE PRESIDENT: If what is contested here,
10 this ought to be a short witness. I suppose he did
11 publish these things or print them.

12 MR. DONIHI: His company.

13 THE PRESIDENT: And his personal attitude
14 toward them is quite immaterial as he isn't a pro-
15 fessor or anything like that. He is just a pub-
16 lisher.

17 MR. DONIHI: That is right.

18 THE PRESIDENT: It is a waste of time to
19 postpone the examination of a witness like that,
20 although I did suggest it, but I did not realize
21 for the time being just what type of witness he is.
22 He is more or less a formal witness producing a
23 document, unless the publication of these things
24 is going to be contested.

25 MR. DONIHI: It is the prosecution's wish,

SAKI

CROSS

1 may it please the Court, to comply with the de-
2 sires of the Tribunal in any event, and we are
3 willing to continue at this time, and the defense
4 may take the witness.

5 CROSS-EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. FURNESS:

7 Q Mr. SAKI, in your affidavit you say that
8 these cards were manufactured by your company in
9 July 1941?

10 A Yes, they were published by my company.

11 Q Your company merely published them; it did
12 not distribute them, is that right?

13 A Yes, they distributed -- my company dis-
14 tributed these cards also.

15 Q When did they distribute them?

16 A Although I am not sure, I believe that it
17 was immediately after publication.

18 Q If you distributed -- you do not remember
19 exactly when you distributed them, is that correct?

20 A No, I have no definite remembrance.

21 MR. FURNESS: No further questions from me.

22 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

23 BY DR. KIYOSÉ:

24 Q In the last part of your affidavit, where
25 you say that upon instruction from the Imperial

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CROSS

1 Rule Assistance Association, my company manufac-
2 tured a set of cards. In the last part of that para-
3 graph you say that this particular set was being man-
4 ufactured for the government. By "government" do you
5 mean the Imperial Rule Assistance Association?

6 A The government and Imperial Rule Assistance
7 Association were more or less considered as one and
8 the same thing by us amateurs.

9 Q That is a very extreme statement that you
10 have made. If you confuse the government and the
11 Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the other
12 statements you make -- the veracity of the other
13 statements you make -- can also be questioned. Please
14 state this definitely. If you continue this kind of
15 answer I cannot continue my questions.

16 I ask you again: Is not the term "govern-
17 ment" a mistake for the Imperial Rule Assistance
18 Association? If it is a mistake, you may correct
19 it.

20 A I would like to confirm the document. May
21 I see it again?

22 Q The witness must reply at once. If he
23 cannot reply I shall rest my question here.

24 A It is not that I can't reply, if you will
25 just give me a little time --

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CROSS

1 MR. DONIHI: May it please the Tribunal, of
2 course the witness in this instance would have a
3 right to look at the document.

4 THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that if he made a
5 mistake he may correct it by looking at the docu-
6 ment.

7 A At the time these cards were made they were
8 made, many of them, by direct orders from various
9 branches of the government, and many others also
10 by orders from the Imperial Rule Assistance Asso-
11 ciation. What I meant to say in the affidavit is
12 the one particularly mentioned was representative
13 or typical of the cards that were published.

14 Q That is not an answer to my question. Of
15 course you may have received orders from the govern-
16 ment on another occasion, but what I am asking you,
17 is, the word "government" used here, is that a mis-
18 take for the Imperial Rule Assistance Association?

19 A It may have been a mistake on my part to
20 consider the Imperial Rule Assistance Association
21 and the government as the same thing; but when I
22 used the word "Kamishibai" or story-telling cards
23 in this affidavit, I used it in its plural meaning
24 and mentioned this particular one as one being
25 typical of those published by orders sent from the

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CROSS

1 government.

2 Q Then, from what branch of the government
3 did you receive orders?

4 A I can't say exactly, but very many depart-
5 ments at that time were connected with this project.

6 Q The point I am asking you: In the English
7 text of your affidavit begins with the words, "This
8 particular set is a typical example, " etc. I am
9 not asking you of Kamishibai in general, but of this
10 particular set, so your answer is no answer at all
11 to my question.

12 A This particular set was made by the Imperial
13 Rule Assistance Association.

14 Q I understand. There is one other ques-
15 tion I would like to ask: Kamishibai, or paper
16 theater cards, already existed in our country long
17 before, did they not?

18 A Not very old, but it is quite well known
19 that it began in the early part of the Showa era,
20 or in the latter 1920's.

21 Q But these Kamishibai were very common;
22 they were vulgar productions, and although it was
23 in wartime, this attempt was by the Imperial Rule
24 Assistance Association. Was it not an attempt to
25 raise the standard of these paper theater productions?

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CROSS

1 A Aside from this particular set in question,
2 I will admit, as you say, that the first productions
3 were of a very low grade and that efforts were made
4 to raise their standards by such movements as the
5 Educational Kamishibai Movement.

6 Q And is it not also true that these paper
7 theater cards taught the children to be kind, to be
8 honest, to study their lessons, et cetera, and that
9 this particular set was only one?

10 A Yes, there were many of them for general
11 use and also many to be used in the agricultural dis-
12 tricts in order to promote their cultural develop-
13 ment.

14 DR. KIYOSHI: Thank you.

15 MR. DONINI: The prosecution does not desire
16 to examine the witness.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Well, this is a convenient
18 break.

19 We will adjourn now until thirty minutes
20 past nine tomorrow morning.

21 (Whereupon, at 1558, an adjournment
22 was taken until Friday, 21 June 1946, at
23 0930.)
